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Levinas and the Invisibility
of God
Jeffrey Dudiak

T

he thought of Emmanuel Levinas is notoriously difficult, and
nowhere more so than in his comments à propos God. This is
evinced, among other things, in that many theistic readers find in
Levinas an advocate and companion, a voice crying in the largely
Godless contemporary, intellectual wilderness, while other equally
credible readers insist that Levinas was, and must be read as, an atheist.
I will illustrate that this ambiguity arises in large measure from the fact
that for Levinas the question of theism and atheism, of the existence
or non-existence of God, is neither the first nor the most important
question; rather, the invisibility of God, the structurally necessary
temptation of atheism, is central to the efficacy of God’s work in the
world. That is, the “absence” of God is, for Levinas, constitutive of
God’s genuine “presence” amongst us.

A. Suffering Ethics
Because of the severity of the climb for a non-specialist audience, I will
take some paragraphs to introduce (in an admittedly inadequate way,
1
and one plagued by the prejudices of my own reading ) the thought of
Levinas, and to provide a context for my later comments on Levinas’s
take on God and theology.
As Quakers, we are sympathetic to the claim that our teachings need
be grounded in experience; thus I begin with a few brief biographical
2
comments. Born a Lithuanian Jew in 1906, Levinas’s family moved,
under ethnic pressure, to Ukraine while he was still a boy. His father
was the proprietor of a bookshop. While yet a teenager Levinas set
off to the University of Strasbourg, also traveling to Freiburg to
study phenomenology with Edmund Husserl. There he encountered
Husserl’s most brilliant student, the soon to be famous Martin
Heidegger, who would remain a lifelong foil for Levinas’s own work.
Early in his career Levinas became something of a potential star himself,
publishing the book on Husserl and Heidegger that was discovered
by J.-P. Sartre, and launched the latter’s existentialist project of Being
5
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and Nothingness. Levinas’s early career was interrupted, however,
by the outbreak of World War II; Levinas joined the French army,
was taken prisoner, and spent most of the war years in a work camp.
Though Levinas’s wife and young child were secreted away during
the war in a French monastery, virtually the whole of his family back
in Eastern Europe fell victim to the Shoah. The Nazi horror became,
for Levinas, and not surprisingly, the focus of the rest of his life and
work. In a sort of parallel to Adorno’s claim that it is barbaric to write
poetry after Auschwitz, the fulcrum of Levinas’s thinking after the war
became: Can there be ethics after Auschwitz? Indeed, one of the ways
he described for his own work was as an extended meditation on the
Holocaust. A twentieth century European philosopher, his audience
was, for the most part, comprised of highly cultivated despisers of
religion and morality, for whom, as he once put it, the only blasphemy
was to gainsay Nietzsche. It is into this impoverished culture, the
inheritor of Greek philosophical thought, that Levinas spoke, at
whose most learned and humanistic heart—early twentieth century
Germany—erupted the most atrocious inhumanity. Something had
gone tragically amiss, which Levinas’s work seeks to both analyze
and address. And while Levinas found inspiration also in some of the
high points of Western philosophy, his principal inspiration was the
Talmud, such that, under another auto-description, Levinas claimed
to be translating Jewish wisdom into Greek.
A Critique of Ethics
Levinas thus embarks upon what might be called “a critique of ethics,”
a critique of the ethics, such as they were, which had so miserably
and scandalously failed European culture. Of course, the stance of
the critic over against that which is the subject of “critique” is not
merely negative. A movie critic, for example, does not generally take
up a negative stance toward movies per se, but, most of the time,
loves movies, and reflects on what is good and bad, of worth or not
of worth, in film. The more philosophical precedent is Kant, with
his “critiques” of reason, who does not criticize reason, but seeks
to understand it—to trace out its conditions. Likewise Levinas with
ethics; he seeks to provide a critique of universal ethical laws, of rules,
of justice, of “ethical systems.” What are they? How are they possible?
What do they mean? How do and should they function?
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How are we to think this? Imagine that you are carrying on with
your life as usual—listening to a lecture perhaps. You are focused on
the material, trying to understand, thinking critically about the claims
being made while in the course of critically appropriating them, when
all of a sudden, someone—it doesn’t matter who, someone you know
and love or a complete stranger—begins to cough, and then cough
more violently, interrupting your concentration, and the lecture itself.
This cough degenerates into gasping; the person’s eyes roll back into
his head, and he collapses onto the floor. What do you do?
Of course, you help. After a moment of disorientation, you rush to
the sufferer’s assistance. You may not know quite what to do, but you
know you must do something. But how do you know this? You do not
have to ask a friend. You do not need to consult a set of holy writings.
And you certainly do not seek advice from a philosopher (you’d be
so confused you wouldn’t know what to do)! No, you know that you
must respond because, in Levinas’s phrasing, the suffering face of the
other demands it. Nothing more can, or need, be said—and, in fact, if
more is said, so much the worse, as we shall see.
Now, “the face” in Levinas does not mean simply the face
physiologically speaking, the eyes, ears, nose and mouth, but it is
rather a trope for the vulnerability of the person: his very susceptibility
to violence and outrage. It is, indeed, and perhaps most often, in the
contorted expressions of one’s physiognomy, in the blotching that
testifies the ravages of age or ill-health, in the lines and scars—physical
or emotional—left upon it by a life lived in an unsympathetic world,
that this vulnerability to suffering is most vividly displayed. Indeed,
for Levinas, the slouching of the shoulders, the crookedness of limbs,
the crippling swelling of arthritic hands, are equally one’s “face” in
this sense.
Faced with the face, Levinas claims, I am “guilty.” By guilty, he
does not mean that the guilty one has “caused” the suffering; you,
hopefully, have played no role in precipitating the suffering of the
one whose face you encounter. Coming across an automobile accident
victim, I need not have been driving the car to be obligated to help.
Playing on the fact that in some languages the word for “guilt” and
the word for “debt” (for example: Schuld in German) are the same
word. Levinas thus argues that, even if my actions did not precipitate
the suffering, I am still in the debt of the suffering one. I owe him
something, namely: my best attempts at curative aid. I am “responsible
to” the suffering one whether or not I am “responsible for” the
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suffering. I may have had nothing to do with his suffering; yet his
suffering has everything to do with me. In this sense, I am “guilty.”
This severing of my responsibility from any action I have committed
evinces my absolute “passivity” in the encounter with the face, and the
irrecusability of the obligation it imposes. Faced with the suffering
other, I must respond; I am responsible independently of any decision
I might make regarding the situation or of any obligations I have
chosen to contract. Even though I often—perhaps even most often—
do not respond as I must, this has no bearing on the fact that I am
obligated to do so: despite myself! Being “subject to” rather than the
“subject of” the ethical experience of the face, I am in no position
to dictate whether or not I am responsible to it. For Levinas, Cain’s
query, “Am I my brother’s keeper?”, can only be rhetorical subterfuge,
an attempt to evade a responsibility already assigned and recognized.
This allows us, crucially, to have a profoundly different understanding
of ourselves as human subjects than the one propagated across
philosophical/Occidental thought and culture whereby we think of
ourselves in terms of being agents, actively relating to our world (and
the fact that we think of it as “our” world is already evidence of this)
and to others. Think here of the “subject” of a sentence: that which
acts across the verb upon the “object,” which latter merely receives the
action of the former. The Western, philosophical subject is a power,
an “I can” (je peux), grammatically in the nominative case (i.e., in the
position of the active agent), an “I.” Harkening back to the Hebrew
hineni, the “here I am,” uttered by Abraham and Moses and Samuel
in response to God’s call, Levinas presents us with an alternative way
of thinking the essence of the human subject. His French translation
of hineni is “me voici,” literally meaning “see me here,” but is the
most common way of saying “here I am.” Of note here is that the
“me” in me voici is not in the position of the active subject (the “I”),
but is already the object of a call that comes to it from outside. It does
not first act, but is acted upon; the face obligates me before I have
agreed to any social contract, without my consent. Grammatically, this
human subject is in the “accusative” (as opposed to nominative) case;
I am accused, “called out” to be who I am; I am who I am when the
finger is pointed at me. Before I am an active agent, I am the passive
recipient of a call that comes to me from beyond myself, independent
of my will, despite myself. I do not, in the first instance—and contrary
to the whole freedom motif that dominates modern thought—get to
choose who I am. I am not, in the first instance, an active agent. I am
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who I am as subject to my obligations. I am myself, as opposed to being
someone else, or just anybody at all, as respondent to the call upon
my life, as responsible for what only I can do. Only I can be the father
to my son, only I can be the husband of my wife, there are things
that, given my experience and background, only I can offer to my
students, there are contributions that only I can make to my meeting.
And I am who I am as so called. “I” am not an origin, but a response,
and thus—from the first and from before the first—responsible. As
Levinas is fond of putting it, “to be or not to be is not the question.”
I do not exist first, and then become responsible (or not); I exist as
responsible, as responsibility. Or, as Levinas also summarily puts it:
“Ethics precedes ontology.”
This reverting of the active “subject of ...” into the primordial
self as “subject to ...” reverses the vectors of meaning that, in both
transcendental phenomenology and hermeneutics, typically run form
the interpreting subject—pre-equipped with the categories in terms
of which everything experienced is taken as this or as that—to the
interpreted object. Imposing the meanings I find in me upon the other
is, for Levinas, an act of violence. For Levinas, the face of the other cuts
back across any interpretative categories I would apply to her; faced
with the suffering of the other, it is my interpretive categories that
are “interpreted,” called into question, insofar as they would provide
any alibi for avoiding my responsibility to and for the other. And this
is why for Levinas the other is genuinely other—not because she is
entirely different from me, ontologically or anthropologically, but
because the other qua other is refractory to my pre-understandings; I
do not get to decide to whom or whether I am responsible. The face
leaves me no such latitude. The categories in terms of which I interpret
the situation need be responsive to, rather than determinative of, my
obligations to the face. In Levinas’s terms, “the other” de-centers
“the same” (me with my prejudices and expectations); the other as
“infinity” exceeds the “totality” (my attempt to subsume all including
the other into the world as I know it) and is—prior to any meanings I
would bring to the situation—meaningfulness itself.
Ethics as traditionally conceived within our tradition (qua
philosophical or theological science), on Levinas’s reading, has been
overwhelmingly an attempt to determine a priori the obligations I
do, and do not, have toward the other. Ethics in this sense is the
aspiration to have a rule for every situation (whether given by God,
arrived at by pure reason, indexed to pleasure, or what have you), to
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have ethics as a “neutral third” besides myself and the other, a set of
regulations that applies equally to both of us, to all of us. Two things
follow: first, ethics so conceived participates in the attempt to reduce
the other to the same, to interpret the other as another me, an alter
ego (i.e., another I). Consequently, I need not focus on the other
to determine what I owe her, but can determine this solely on the
basis of what I myself need, since we are, after all, the same. Against
this, Levinas posits an essential asymmetry in the ethical relationship:
what I owe the other is not correlative with what the other owes me.
I am responsible for him whether or not he is responsible for me.
Whether he is or not, as Levinas abruptly puts it, “is his business.”
Secondly, ethics qua this system of rules or law thus interposes itself
between me and the face, dictating what to do, for whom, when, and
for how long—thus limiting my responsibility. My focus here is upon
the rules, and not on the other, and my fidelity is to the former, since
it is this that dictates what I owe to the latter. As such, ethics is, in a
paradoxical reversal, an impediment to responsibility for the other,
rather than its guarantee.
And, after Auschwitz, any impediment to my responsibility to the
face, any system or rationalization or excuse that justifies or accepts or
resigns itself to such suffering on any grounds, is not only suspect, but
3
the scandalous itself.
Just Ethics
So I am called (we are called) to attend to the face—which Levinas,
replacing the earlier and more traditional sense, now calls “ethics”—
prior to any systematization or codification (and thus limitation!) of
that responsibility, which as such is asymmetrical and infinite, to the
point of taking “the bread from one’s own mouth, to nourish the
4
hunger of another with one’s own fasting.” Yet, if only this impossible
demand were so easy! For in our world, where the obligation to the
face of the other “holds” (or has a hold on me), it is also always already
“disturbed.”
Recall that you are attending to the suffering one, the one whose
eyes rolled back in his head and who collapsed on the floor in a seizure.
All of a sudden, and as unexpectedly, another person, across the room,
likewise doubles over in pain, and collapses on the floor with a haunting
thud. Now what? The face of the second sufferer imposes itself with
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all of the force of obligation as the first. The infinite responsibility
for the first is interrupted by another infinite responsibility; I must
respond to both, to each, with the same selfless abandon, and at the
same time! But, how, as a finite being, can I do so? I must make the
difficult choice of who comes before whom, which Levinas refers to
as a “comparison of incomparables.” My absolute responsibility for
the other, which I am in no position to question as subject to it, now
must be called into question—in light of another face, the face of
another other. This for Levinas introduces the question of justice, for
I now must regulate my responsibility, subject it to a rule, distribute
it among my neighbors.
Such a situation is not, of course, the exception, but our everyday
reality; we never are, and never were, called to respond only to a
single other. There are always other others, a multitude of others,
as numerically infinite (for extending even to the faces of all future
generations) as each face itself is infinitely obligating. If I were,
therefore, to give myself wholly to the first face (which I am ethically
required to do!) at the expense of the second, then my ethical response
5
would be—in an irony to beat all others!—profoundly unjust. To be
just, my ethical obligation to the other must take the form of a care
for all, which requires law, and institutions, and universal norms—all
of that which, qua “ethics as codification,” “ethics as responsibility
for the face” called into question to begin with. And this is why, to
return to the beginning of this section, we find in Levinas not an unnuanced “criticism” of ethics, but a “critique” of ethics qua universal
laws of conduct. The latter are necessary for justice, but dangerous
to the ethical moment that animates the requirement of justice; the
face and the faces are what makes justice possible and necessary, but
justice in its universality is an ongoing threat to the other as other
who continues, qua face, to call all such systems into question. A rule
must be established that—per impossible—is fair to all, but that yet
answers to the face of the singular, vulnerable other—the very raison
d’être of justice in the first place. As Theo de Boer has so precisely put
it, “Levinas lays a foundation—and at the same time some dynamite—
6
under institutions,” as under the ethical rules, of which these are the
embodiment.
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B. The Invisibility

of

God

Now, what I want to point out is that this exposition of ethics, as
7
responsibility to the other (“the ethical”) and as the “subsequent”
transition of ethics into principles (“justice”), has been transacted
without reference to God. Of highest interest is that while Levinas
insists that this must be possible, he himself includes in his exposition
of ethics frequent references to God—references that are, moreover,
neither superfluous nor incidental. So God need not be excluded from
an exposition of ethics, even while the exposition of ethics must not
rely upon reference to God. Levinas permits of a certain God-talk
(within the limits of ethics alone, to employ a quasi-Kantian idiom),
yet will reject any “theological ethics,” i.e., an ethics derived from
prior theological posits. For Levinas, this always possible omission
of God from an account of ethics is a matter of neither mere nor
willful neglect, but integral to ethics—a claim, clearly, with important
implications for theology.
Losing Face
Levinas’s concern with theological ethics relies upon his observation
that when God is made the fulcrum of ethics, rather than mediating
between the other and myself in a way that opens up in governing
the relationship between us (the point upon which any ultimately
theological system of morals insists), “God” in fact functions as an
impediment to my “face-to-face” relationship to the other. Two
articulations of this concern present themselves.
If, as per theological ethics, I must turn my eyes first toward God
to receive my marching orders regarding my neighbor (as in the
typical reading of Jesus’ summary of the law and the prophets—first
love the Lord your God with all your heart, soul, and mind, and then,
as a by-product of this theophily, love your neighbor as yourself),
how—bedazzled by the blazing radiance of the glory that is God,
the Infinite, the fullness of Being of the “I am that I am”—am I to
simultaneously, or even subsequently, to re-focus my eyes in the dark
upon the lowly stranger, widow and orphan, the “others” who are
anything but luminous, the inglorious, painfully fleshly shadowy ones
8
whom even the Scriptures refer to as those who “are not”? How,
on the model of theological ethics, is the face not overwhelmed and
eclipsed (even occluded) by the presence of God? How could the
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neighbor in his poverty and pathos possibly compete for attention
with the splendor and glory of God?
But even if such refocusing were, however improbable, possible,
a model that insists I must turn my gaze on high in order to see my
neighbor here below means that my relationship to him will always
be indirect, refractory. This brings us to a second, closely related
but distinguishable, concern that a God who is required to mediate
my relationship with the other becomes, instead, a means by which
the other is reduced to the same—the very image of Occidental/
philosophical violence according to Levinas. If God mediates the
relationship between persons, sets forth the commandments in terms
of which we are to conduct ourselves regarding each other, two
consequences follow: (1) I am ethically oriented toward and by the
divine commands that dictate to me my obligations to the neighbor,
not oriented to the neighbor according to his need (his face); and (2)
since the same divine commands apply to us all, the other becomes,
effectively, another “same,” triggering a power-play that not only
permits but requires that I enforce upon the other what I take God to
be enforcing upon me, thus responding to the other not on his own
terms, but on mine, according to what I take to be good for me. To
the extent that I am capable of finding myself in relationship with the
other on this model, I am impeded from finding myself in relationship
with the other as other. Case in point: I am far more likely to impose
what I take to be the law of God upon the other than I am to impose
upon myself what the other takes to be the law of God. God (on the
model of theological ethics) becomes the means (i.e., mediating term)
by which the other is assigned his place in the cosmic economy as I
understand it: as sinner or saint, among the lost or chosen, a goat
or a sheep, where these categories (or whatever ones my theology
implies) dictate who the other is, and what I, in consequence, do
(or do not) owe him. God becomes here, not only a distraction
from the obligations issuing from the face, but—even beyond mere
mitigation—at times the very organ for overriding them.
Once again: for Levinas, anything that interrupts the immediacy
and directness of the face-to-face relationship, anything that serves
to “lessen the shock” of the irremissable obligation that the face
imposes, must be relativized. Anything, ... including God! That is why,
for Levinas, if we are still to speak of God, we must do so in a way that
keeps the face central to our concern. We can now turn to what might
be called—with all due caution—Levinas’s theology.
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Levinas’s “Theology”
There are two principal places in Levinas’s discourse where Godtalk figures prominently, where Levinas speaks of God at work, or,
in Levinas’s own phrase, where God “comes to the idea,” and, not
surprisingly, in both cases the context is governed by ethical, rather
than straightforwardly theological, concerns.
The first involves the very mise en scène of the ethical situation itself,
wherein I find myself obligated, guilty without excuse, to the other—
testifying to God, glorifying God, across my having been called to
neighbor love: “The glory of the Infinite is the archaic identity of the
subject flushed out without being able to slip away. It is the ego led
to sincerity, making signs to the other, for whom and before whom
I am responsible, of this very giving of signs, of this responsibility:
‘here I am.’ The saying prior to anything said [i.e., my finding myself
responsible before I respond in terms of some or other concrete
9
articulation of this responsibility] bears witness to glory.” According
to Levinas, God does not appear directly to me, as “an alleged
interlocutor,” but only across the face-to-face relationship with the
human other. “The Infinite then has glory only through subjectivity,
in the human adventure of the approach of the other, through the
10
substitution for the other, by the expiation for the other.” God gets
the glory, as it were, for my finding myself responsible for the other.
“God’s glory” is precisely a translation for my having been assigned
to the other, to the care for the other where the other—in his poverty
and vulnerability—is “higher” than myself, which Levinas describes
with the evocative metaphor of the “curvature of intersubjective
space.” For Levinas, “This ‘curvature of space’ is, perhaps, the very
11
presence of God.”
The second place where Levinas speaks of God as integral to
the ethical adventure, paralleling my being assigned by God to the
other, is where the other takes responsibility for me. Remember my
earlier description of the “transition” from ethics to justice, from my
responsibility for one to my responsibility for all. In this situation,
where I am called upon to divide my responsibility among the others,
there is yet no warrant for my demanding or expecting that the other
will be reciprocally responsible for me—even if, Levinas claims, there
can be no true justice unless there is justice for me too. And yet,
mirabile dictu!, the other—and thus in excess of what I can insist
upon or expect—does care for me. “[I]t is only thanks to God [grâce à
dieu] that, as a subject incomparable with the other, I am approached
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as an other by the others, that is ‘for myself.’ ‘Thanks to God’ I am
another for the others. ... The passing of God, of whom I can speak
only by reference to this aid or this grace, is precisely the reverting of
12
the incomparable subject into a member of society.” Indeed, while
my business is my responsibility for the other(s), the other, due to the
grace of God, has always already cared for me. Even before I was born,
even as I was being knitted in the womb, the (m-)other cared for me
with a sacrificial love, caring for me out of her own nourishment,
loving me as “the other in the same,” the very trope (“maternity”)
that Levinas employs in his later work to describe my relation to my
neighbor. And Levinas extends the family metaphors to describe
God’s role in the “justice,” which places me on an equal footing with
my (br-)others, referring to the God of monotheism as bespeaking
the common parentage of all people, equals, despite (and founded
upon) my asymmetrical responsibility to the other. “Synchronization
is the act of consciousness which, through representation and the
said, institutes ‘with the help of God,’ the original locus of justice,
a terrain common to me and the others where I am counted among
them, that is, where subjectivity is a citizen with all the duties and
rights measured and measurable which the equilibrated ego involves,
or equilibrating itself by the concourse of duties and the concurrence
13
of rights.” Justice is for me, too. Thank God!
The Trace of God
Having turned me toward the other, and the other toward me, God—
if not to be an impediment to neighbor-love—must withdraw from the
scene so that I am directed, unimpeded and non-distracted, into the
immediacy of the face-to-face relationship. God, in setting the ethical
scene, removes himself from the scene, must himself be unseen. God,
having left a trace of his glory across the responsibility that we bear for
one another, is no longer he to whom, or of whom, we speak, even if
in speaking to the other in responsibility we bespeak, with or without
acknowledgment, the glory of God. Thus, says Levinas:
The Infinite is not in front of its witness, but as it were outside,
or on the ‘other side’ of presence, already past, out of reach,
a thought behind thoughts which is too lofty to push itself
up front. ‘Here I am, in the name of God,’ without referring
myself to his presence. ‘Here I am,’ just that! The Word God
is still absent from the phrase in which God is for the first time
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involved in words. It does not state ‘I believe in God.’ To bear
witness to God is precisely not to state this extraordinary word,
as though glory would be lodged in a theme and be posited as
a thesis, or become being’s essence. As a sign given to the other
of this very signification, the ‘here I am’ signifies me to the other
in the name of God, at the service of the men who look at me,
without having anything to identify myself with, but the sound
14
of my voice or the figure of my gesture—the saying itself.
To be effective as the non-diverting charge to neighbor-love, this
withdrawal of God must be so complete, so convincing, that atheism
(real, not a feigned, atheism) must be a permanent possibility—but
an atheism, a divine atheism, that nevertheless testifies to the glory
of God:
The infinite would be belied in the proof that the finite would
like to give of its transcendence; entering into conjunction
with the subject that would make it appear, it would lose its
glory. Transcendence owes it to itself to interrupt its own
demonstration. Its voice has to be silent as soon as one listens
for the message. It is necessary that its pretension be exposed to
derision and refutation, to the point of suspecting in the ‘here I
am’ that attests to it a cry or a slip of a sick subjectivity. But of a
15
subjectivity responsible for the other!
One wonders whether the biblical claim that no one can see God and
live has less to do with some specter of sacred terror, and more to do
with the impediment to interpersonal life that “God’s presence” can
effect. Marked by a kenosis to the point of the real possibility of nonexistence, Levinas’s God is eminently worthy of worship in his refusal
of worship—except as translated into care for the stranger, widow, and
orphan. Glory be to God!

Endnotes
1 I provide a detailed argument for this reading in my book The Intrigue of Ethics: A study
of the idea of discourse in the thought of Emmanuel Levinas (New York: Fordham
University Press, 2001). That work represents the exegetical background to the more
popular and “breezy” account provided here.
2 He died December 25th, 1995.
3 Of course, once having bought into this account of ethics, it is the face that becomes the
scandal. Legalism is easier than neighbor-love, and in most cases therefore preferred by
us. It is infinite obligation to the other that is hard, and, as we shall shortly see, even
impossible, but no less holy for that.
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4 Emmanuel Levinas, Otherwise than Being or Beyond Essence (trans. A. Lingis, The Hague:
Martinus Nijhoff, 1981), 56.
5 This is why, early on, Levinas was critical of “love” as “a solitude of two,” where the
concern for and devotion to one other comes at the expense of the concern for the other
others. In his later work he softened his critique of love, though not of the motivation
behind it.
6 Theodore de Boer, “An Ethical Transcendental Philosophy,” in Face to Face with Levinas
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